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ABSTRACT
The success of an innovating firm often depends on the efforts of other innovators in its
environment. How do the challenges faced by external innovators affect the focal firm‟s
outcomes? To address this question we first characterize the external environment according to
the structure of interdependence. We follow the flow of inputs and outputs in the ecosystem to
distinguish between upstream components that are bundled by the focal firm, and downstream
complements that are bundled by the firm‟s customers. We argue that the effect of external
innovation challenges depends not only on their magnitude, but also on their location in the
ecosystem relative to the focal firm – whereas greater innovation challenges in components
enhances the benefits that accrue to technology leaders, greater innovation challenges in
complements erodes these benefits. We further argue that the effectiveness of vertical integration
as a strategy to manage ecosystem interdependence increases over the course of the technology
life cycle. We explore these arguments in the context of the global semiconductor lithography
industry from its emergence in 1962 to 2005 across nine distinct technology generations. We
find strong support for our arguments.
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INTRODUCTION
A firm‟s competitive advantage depends on its ability to create more value than its rivals
(Porter, 1996; Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996). Greater value creation, in turn depends on the
firms‟ ability to innovate successfully. To capture the returns from innovation, many firms strive
to be technology leaders in their industry by being first to introduce new innovations to the
market. A given innovation, however, often does not stand alone; rather, it depends on
accompanying changes in the firm‟s environment for its own success (Adner, 2006). These
external changes, which require innovation on the part of other actors, embed the focal firm
within an ecosystem of interdependent innovations.
Consider, for example, Airbus‟s monumental investment in pioneering the super-jumbo
passenger aircraft with its A380 offer. Airbus, as the focal firm, faces significant challenges in
designing and manufacturing the core airframe of the airplane. Beyond this internal challenge, it
also relies on a host of suppliers for subassemblies and components. Some of these suppliers are
themselves confronted with significant innovation challenges to deliver components that meet
Airbus‟s requirements (e.g., engine; navigation system), while others will not need to innovate at
all (e.g., carpeting). Receiving these various components, Airbus faces the additional challenge
of integrating them with the airframe in order to deliver a functioning aircraft to its airline
customers. In order for the aircraft to be used productively by airlines, however, a number of
other actors in the environment, outside of Airbus‟s direct supply chain, confront additional
innovation challenges as well. Complementors such as airports need to invest and develop new
infrastructure to accommodate the oversized aircraft; regulators need to specify new safety
procedures; training simulator manufacturers need to develop new simulators on which aircraft
crews can be trained. The A380 innovation ecosystem is thus comprised not only of Airbus as
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the core innovator, but also its upstream suppliers, and its downstream buyers and complementors,
all of whom need to resolve their own innovation challenges in order for the focal A380 offer to
create value.
Understanding competitive advantage in such „innovation ecosystems,‟ requires a change
in the way in which the strategy field has traditionally approached the relationship between a firm
and its external partners. Specifically, it requires an approach that extends beyond the focus on
how different actors will bargain over value capture (e.g., Porter, 1980; Brandenburger and Stuart,
1996) to include an explicit consideration of the innovation challenges that different actors will
need to overcome in order for value to be created in the first place. In this paper we present an
approach to analyzing the dynamics of value creation that focuses on the role of innovation
challenges in a firm‟s ecosystem as potential bottlenecks to value creation. We draw key
distinctions between challenges that need to be confronted by the focal firm, its suppliers, and its
complementors, and reveal differences in their impact on the firm‟s ability to create value, as well
as their implication for the firm‟s ability to capture value.
The ecosystem construct, as a way of making interdependencies more explicit, has gained
prominence in both business strategy (Moore, 1996; Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Adner, 2006) and
practice (e.g., Intel, 2004; SAP, 2006). These approaches have focused on understanding
coordination among partners in exchange networks that are characterized by simultaneous
cooperation and competition (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1997; Afuah, 2000). Studies in this
vein explore the challenges that arise when incentives across the ecosystem are not aligned
(Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie, 2005), the role of established relationships with ecosystem
partners in shaping firm‟s motivations to compete for different market segments (Christensen and
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Rosenbloom, 1995), and the activities that focal firms undertake to induce partners to favor their
specific technology platforms (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002).
Notice, however, that these studies are primarily concerned with strategic interactions
among firms, extending the concerns of bargaining power and leverage from the context of
bilateral partnerships (e.g., Teece, 1986) and industries (e.g., Porter, 1980) to the context of
ecosystems. Notice too, that while they are clearly sensitive to the presence of different roles and
actors along the value chain (i.e., drawing clear distinctions between suppliers, complementors,
and buyers), the specific value chain position of a counterparty relative to the focal firm has had
no impact on the resulting analysis – i.e., the impact of a partner with high bargaining power on
the focal firm‟s ability to capture value is exactly the same regardless of whether the counter
party is positioned as a complementor, a buyer, or a supplier.
In this paper we argue that understanding the dynamics of value creation requires an
explicit consideration of the asymmetries that arise from the positions of different counterparties
relative to the focal firm. We show a firm‟s ability to create value is impacted in very different
ways depending on whether it is upstream or downstream partners that face innovation challenges
– i.e., the impact of high external innovation challenges on the focal firm depends on whether the
challenges are confronted by suppliers (which affects the components that the firm needs to
integrate in order to offer a complete product to its customers) or by complementors (in which
case the firm can offer its complete product to the customer, but the customer cannot utilize it to
its full potential).
We examine how the magnitude and the location of innovation challenges within a firm‟s
ecosystem impact its ability to create value and to achieve competitive advantage. We present a
simple structure for locating challenges relative to the firm according to the flow of activities
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within the ecosystem. We use this lens to consider two interrelated questions: First, how the
structure of technological interdependence – the location of challenges relative to the focal firm –
affects the benefit that accrues to technology leaders (i.e., firms that pioneer the introduction of
new technology generations). Second, how the effectiveness of vertical integration as a strategy
for managing technological interdependence changes over the course of a technology‟s life cycle.
The first mover advantage literature has identified important considerations under which
technology leaders gain or lose from early entry into new markets. Both the applied and
scholarly literatures are replete with studies, prescriptions, and caveats regarding the merits of
pioneering new opportunities (e.g., Leiberman and Montgomery, 1988; 1998; Mitchell, 1991;
Golder and Tellis, 1993; Christensen et.al., 1998). Consistent with strong arguments for and
against the benefits of leading in the introduction of new innovations, the empirical findings have
been decidedly mixed, with some studies reporting significant pioneering advantages, while
others report disadvantages and non-effects (e.g., Kerin et.al., 1992; VanderWerf and Mahon,
1997).
The debates over technology leadership have tended to overlook the nature of the
technology challenges that leaders and their ecosystems must overcome. In so doing, they have
neglected a key contingency. In this paper we move beyond the literature‟s traditional analysis of
firms‟ positions vis-à-vis their rivals. We explicitly consider the innovation challenges that reside
in the firm‟s environment and need to be confronted by external partners if the focal innovation is
to succeed in the market. We develop a simple framework for characterizing the technological
uncertainty associated with external innovation challenges. We argue that the location of
challenges impacts the steepness of firms‟ learning curves, their rate of progress along these
curves, and the extent of spillovers to rivals. We predict that challenges in components increase
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the performance advantage attributable to technology leaders, while challenges in complements
decrease this advantage.1 Although external innovation challenges have long been a feature of
the technology literature (e.g., Rosenberg, 1976), component and complement challenges have
most often been considered simultaneously, and aggregated into the broad category of systems of
innovation (e.g., Hughes, 1982). In contrast, by being explicit about the structure of technology
interdependence, we distinguish between the roles of component and complements as elements of
the ecosystem. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to explicitly postulate and test their
asymmetric effects.
In exploring how ecosystem challenges impact innovators‟ outcomes, an obvious question
that arises is how firms can improve their coordination of technological changes within the
ecosystem. We consider firms‟ vertical integration of key components as a governance strategy
to manage this interdependence. We integrate arguments from the literatures on technology life
cycles (Rosenberg, 1976; Sahal, 1981; Dosi, 1982) and transaction cost economics (Williamson,
1985) and suggest that while technological challenges tend to decrease as technologies mature,
contractual challenges need not dissipate over time. Because vertical integration mitigates
contractual hazards, but not necessarily technology challenges, we argue that the shifting balance
of technological and contractual challenges will act to increase the benefit from vertical
integration over the course of the technology life cycle. Hence, vertical integration is likely to be
more effective after a technology has reached a stage of maturity, rather than during its
emergence.

1

Note that our focus is not in specifying whether technology leaders will have a competitive advantage. Rather, our
focus is on specifying whether competitive advantage from technology leadership is enhanced or eroded by the
magnitude and location of external innovation challenges.
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We test these arguments in the context of the global semiconductor lithography equipment
industry from its emergence in 1962 to 2005, a period during which the industry transitioned
through nine distinct technology generations. While focal innovators faced significant challenges
in each of these generational transitions, the extent to which suppliers and complementors faced
innovation challenges varied across these generations, providing us with an ideal setting in which
to test the impact of ecosystem uncertainty on technology leaders. We constructed a unique data
set to test our arguments. The data includes a novel measure of ecosystem challenges for each of
the nine technology generations, as well as information about every firm that ever participated in
the industry.
Our study makes a number of contributions. First, it introduces a structured approach for
analyzing technology interdependence. This approach offers a new perspective for understanding
innovators‟ outcomes during periods of technological change (e.g., Tushman and Anderson,
1986). By using an ecosystem lens to examine the benefits of technology leadership, we expand
the scope of inquiry beyond its traditional focus on direct competitors to identify the underlying
mechanisms by which uncertainty in components and complements exercise opposing effects on
the performance of technology leaders and laggards (e.g., Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988).
By disaggregating the external environment into upstream and downstream constituents, we show
that the location of uncertainty matters no less than its magnitude, and offer a finer grained view
of the interaction between organizations and their environments (e.g., Lawrence and Lorch, 1967)
and its implication for the dynamics of value creation (e.g. Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996;
Adner and Zemsky, 2006); To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study that
operationalizes the environment in this way. By linking the flow of activities among partners to
the distribution of innovation challenges across the ecosystem we shed light on a key mechanism
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of joint value creation and contribute to the emerging literature on ecosystem strategy (e.g.,
Moore, 1996; Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Adner, 2006). Finally, by explicitly considering the
changing benefits of vertical integration over the course of the technology lifecycle we contribute
towards an understanding of how firm‟s boundary choices affect their performance outcomes
over time (e.g., Stigler, 1951; Argyres and Bigelow, 2007; Novak and Stern, 2008).

AN ECOSYSTEM PERSPECTIVE
Individual innovations often reside within broader systems. In such cases, understanding
an innovation‟s consequences requires understanding its relationship to its external context.
Hughes‟ (1983) rich description of the emergence of the electrical power network highlights the
obstacles raised when some technological elements of an ecosystem lag behind others in
resolving their challenges. He attributes the decline of direct current (DC) generation
technologies to bottlenecks in the development of distribution technology for the DC network.
Conversely, Henderson‟s (1995) study of the semiconductor lithography industry (the same
industry we examine in this paper) highlights the role that suppliers, customers and
complementors played in offsetting bottlenecks in optics technology, thereby extending the
dominance of optical lithography over non-optical approaches.
While prior studies have highlighted the importance of external innovations to the success
of focal initiatives, they have not given a clear structure in which to assess the impact of these
external challenges.2 In the absence of such structure, the literature‟s characterization of
uncertainty in the external environment has tended remained at an aggregated level – e.g.,
2

An exception are Afuah‟s studies (Afuah, 2000, Afuah and Bahram, 1995) which have explored how firm
performance is impacted when partners face technology challenges. These studies focus on the overall level of
innovation challenges that partners must confront. In contrast, our study explicitly considers the impact of variations
in both the level and the location of challenges within the ecosystem. In so doing, we are able to uncover new
insights regarding the asymmetric impact of upstream and downstream uncertainty on innovator‟s outcomes.
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distinguishing between stable vs. variable (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967); low vs. high velocity
(Eisenhardt, 1989); smooth vs. abrupt development (Suarez and Lanzolla, 2007). Although these
aggregate characterizations have yielded important insights, we believe that a finer grained level
of analysis can offer addition insight still.
Our specific focus is on uncertainty regarding technological innovations. Rather than
characterizing the extent of uncertainty in the aggregate, we consider the distribution of
innovation challenges across different roles in the ecosystem. We identify these roles and
positions by following the flows of inputs and outputs across the external environment.
Figure 1 shows the schema of our approach. The outputs of upstream suppliers serve as
inputs to the focal actor. We refer to such inputs, which are bundled by the focal actor, as
components. The focal actor‟s output serves as an input to its customer. A customer may need to
bundle the outputs of other firms alongside the focal actor‟s output to utilize the focal actor‟s
offer. We refer to such inputs, which are bundled by the customer, as complements. In this
simple schema, as in our study, we examine only first-tier components and complements; clearly,
this structure can be extended forward and backward along the activity chain to include higher
tiered actors (e.g., supplier‟s suppliers; customer‟s customers).3

(Insert Figure 1 about here)

This framework offers a structure in which to analyze the nature of technology
interdependence. Tracing the flow of activities in an ecosystem allows for the simultaneous
3

Note that components and complements are defined according to where elements are bundled in the flow of
activites relative to the position of the focal offer, not according to whether they are produced by a given firm or
outsourced to another. For example, although Hewlett Packard produces both personal computers and printers, they
remain separate offers that are brought together by the customer: the printer is a complement to the computer
independently of whether it is offered by Hewlett Packard or Cannon.
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consideration of a firm‟s direct interdependence with its suppliers as well as indirect
interdependence with its complementors. This structure allows us to disaggregate the broad
construct of environmental uncertainty to identify both the location and the magnitude of
challenges that surrounds the focal innovator.

TECHNOLOGICAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
How do the magnitude and location of technology challenges in the ecosystem affect the
benefits of technology leadership? Being first to introduce an improved technology to the market
is a common managerial aspiration. Successful technology leaders, by virtue of having beaten
their rivals to market, enjoy reduced competition when presenting their offer to customers.
Whether this temporary exclusivity translates into a sustained competitive advantage over later
entrants, however, depends on the leader‟s ability to exploit its window of opportunity. This will
depend on the relative distribution of challenges across components and complements.

Component Challenges
New innovations are often enabled by changes in components. In such cases, both firms
and their suppliers may face considerable challenges in developing and integrating these new
components into the focal offer (Fine, 1998; Brusoni et.al. 2001). How do component challenges
affect the performance of technology leaders who pioneer new technology generations?
A key driver of early mover advantage is the opportunity to exploit production and market
experience to progress down the learning curve, increasing the firm‟s added value by improving
the offer‟s performance or costs (e.g., Spence, 1981; Lieberman, 1989; 1984; Argote, 1999).
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Empirical studies of learning curves, from the 1930s to the present day, have found significant
variance in learning potential. For example, in their review of twenty two learning curve studies,
Dutton and Thomas (1984) report progress ratios that vary from 55% (high learning opportunity)
to over 100% (no learning opportunity).4
The extent to which progress down the learning curve can be a source of advantage is
intimately linked to the potential for learning – greater advantage is rooted in greater learning
potential. Hence, to understand learning as a source of advantage we must consider what drives
differences in the magnitude of the learning opportunity.
The magnitude of the learning opportunity depends on the extent to which the innovating
firm needs to change its current approach to problem solving, and has the scope for doing so. It is
the emerging mastery of new routines that underlies a firm‟s progress down the learning curve. If
very little change from the status quo is required, it follows that there is not much new for the
firm to learn; hence, both the opportunity for, and the relative advantage from, learning will be
relatively low. In contrast, when the innovating firm needs to overcome high uncertainty and
complexity in order to bring its offer to market, the opportunity for learning will be higher, and so
will be the potential for learning to be a source of competitive advantage. 5
When the focal innovation requires accompanying innovations in components, the focal
firm‟s development challenges increase, as it now must overcome additional hurdles in specifying,
sourcing, and integrating new components into its new designs. These challenges can impact
both the technological as well as organizational routines that must be mastered by the firm in

4

The progress ratio measures the cost reduction associated with a doubling of production. A progress ratio of X%
implies that a doubling of production reduces cost of production to X% of the initial cost.
5
Balasubramanian and Lieberman (2006) report findings that are highly consistent with these arguments. They
study 117 industries to examine how the relationship between experience and productivity depends on R&D intensity
(a proxy for industry development challenges). They find that greater R&D intensity is correlated with lower
progress ratios (i.e., greater learning potential).
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order for it to bring the innovative offer to the market. In this way, component challenges
increase the magnitude of the firm‟s learning opportunity, and hence the advantage it can gain
from progressing down the learning curve in advance of its rivals.
Further, the increased requirements for closer coordination with suppliers (Dyer and
Singh, 1998) and more frequent iterations through design and development cycles (Clark and
Fujimoto, 1991) that accompany challenging components, contribute not only to increasing the
benefits to the technology leader from greater experience with the new technology, but also to
reducing the ease with which later rivals can imitate this progress (e.g., Lippman and Rumelt,
1982; Rivkin, 2000). For example, rivals have found it difficult to imitate innovations that
emerged from the extensive collaboration between Toyota and its key suppliers (Dyer, 1996;
Dyer and Hatch, 2006).

Hypothesis 1: Greater technological challenges in components will increase the performance
advantage of technology leaders.

The degree to which component challenges increase the performance advantage
technology leaders may be tempered by the extent of modularity between the component and the
focal product. Two mechanisms stand out when interfaces are well specified: first, with regard to
the focal firm, there may be less potential for learning because key developments are undertaken
by the supplier. Second, with regard to its rivals, there is the possibility that once the component
has been developed for the technology leader, rivals can free ride on these investments and „plugand-play‟ the component directly into their own offers, thereby reducing the leader‟s period of
exclusivity in the market.
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We note, however, that while these factors can reduce the extent of a leader‟s advantage,
they are unlikely to overturn it. While modularity does reduce interdependence, it does not
eliminate it. For example, Brusoni and Prencipe (2001) note that while modularity allows for the
rise of specialist component suppliers, it also poses greater organizational and knowledge
requirements on the focal firms in their role as system integrators. Similarly, Hoetker‟s (2005)
study of outsourcing choices in the notebook computer market supports the argument that
organizational coordination challenges exist even when technologies are highly modular.

Complement Challenges
We have argued that component challenges can increase both potential for learning as
well as barriers to imitation, and hence increase the advantages that accrue to technology leaders.
How are the factors that support these advantages affected by challenges in complements? The
resolution of component challenges is required in order for a firm to be able to produce its offer
and present it to the market. However, the extent to which the offer can create value for users
depends on the availability of critical complements. For example, the Airbus A380‟s ability to
create value for its airline customers is hampered until airports, as key complementors, undertake
the modifications to their terminals that are required to handle the oversized aircraft.
Many innovations rely on the availability of complements to unlock their full value.
Rosenberg (1972) argues that a single innovation rarely constitutes a “complete innovation,” and
that the opportunities and challenges faced by users in adopting the innovation can be influenced
by the state of development of complements. Hughes (1983) described imbalances in the pace of
development of complementary innovations as creating “negative salients” on the frontier of
technological development. Goldfarb (2005) offers a qualitative examination of how challenges
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in complements delayed the adoption of electricity in the railroad and printing industries in the
early 1900s.
Greater complement innovation challenges result in delays in the availability of the
complement as complementors struggle to overcome their technology hurdles. By reducing the
value creation of the focal offer, delays in the availability of suitable complements act to slow the
adoption rate of the new offer. These adoption delays impact the advantage from technology
leadership in two distinct ways: First, they allow rivals more time to catch up, and possibly
imitate the leader, before the market takes off. Second, because lower rates of adoption will
reduce the firm ability to gain experience (i.e., lower demand will lead to lower production
quantities), the leader will make slower progress down the learning curve during its period of
exclusivity. Hence, even without imitation, later entrants will confront a leader with a smaller
competitive advantage.
By acting to slow both adoption and the accumulation of experience, greater complement
challenges erode the sustainability of the technology leader‟s competitive advantage.

Hypothesis 2: Greater technological challenges in complements will decrease the performance
advantage of technology leaders.

The impact of complement challenges on technology leaders is likely to be affected by the
extent to which complements are open vs. proprietary. When complements are open, such that
they can be used with the offer of any firm, laggards will benefit from any progress that had been
made in the market to advance the leader‟s offer; that is, spillovers will be higher and technology
leaders will see their advantage eroded.
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When complements are proprietary, such that they can only work with the offer of a
particular firm, spillovers will be reduced. However, the leader need not necessarily be better off:
to the extent that there is a new development race to be won in the development of suitable
complements, whether the first firm in the market with the focal offer will also win the race to be
first to market with the key complement will depend on a number of case specific factors. What
is clear, however, is that even when complements are proprietary, high complement challenges
forces firms to compete in a second race for leadership. Hence, regardless of whether
complements are open or proprietary, by putting their leadership into contention a second time,
complement challenges erode the benefit of technology leadership in the focal offer.

The balance of uncertainty: Technology vs. Opportunism
Our discussion is focused on innovation challenges that arise in ecosystems, in which
focal offers need to be combined with components and complements if they are to present a value
creating solution to customers. We have argued that, in such contexts, the distribution of
technology challenges across the ecosystem is an important driver of firms‟ outcomes. We now
consider vertical integration as a governance strategy to manage such interdependence.6
A key benefit of vertical integration is the ability to mitigate contractual hazards. These
contractual hazards arise when firms and their suppliers make asset specific investments under
conditions of uncertainty (Williamson, 1985). When contracting with suppliers for innovative
components with high development challenges, the focal firm faces two specific kinds of
uncertainty. The first is the technological uncertainty surrounding whether and when suppliers

6

In our empirical setting a subset of firms integrate into component production, but no firms integrate into
complements. Hence, because we are only able to test arguments regarding vertical integration into components, we
do not hypothesize about the benefits of integration choices with respect to complements. This question, although
fascinating, lies beyond the scope of this paper.
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will discover appropriate solutions to their development challenges. The second is what
Williamson terms behavioral uncertainty regarding whether and when suppliers will behave
opportunistically to renegotiate agreements and reset terms in their own favor.
The resolution of technology uncertainty determines value creation – if the supplier
cannot produce appropriate components, the firm cannot bring the desired product to market.
The resolution of behavioral uncertainty determines value capture – if the supplier renegotiates
the contract terms opportunistically, the firm cannot appropriate the expected rents.
Early in a technology‟s life cycle, technology uncertainty is at its peak. As development
takes place, knowledge is accumulated and progress becomes more predictable. Although
development continues throughout the lifecycle, and innovation challenges are always present,
within a given trajectory the level of technology uncertainty tends to decrease over time (Dosi,
1982; Sahal, 1981). 7
In contrast to technological uncertainty, which decreases with time, the trend for
behavioral uncertainty as technology matures is ambiguous. On the one hand, increased
experience and repeated interactions can allow firms to specify better formal contracts and extend
relational contracts with their suppliers, such that behavioral uncertainty may decrease over time.
On the other hand, it is also possible for behavioral uncertainty to increase over the technology
life cycle: as firms continue to work with suppliers to improve their offers, the level of
cospecialization, transaction specific assets, and supplier switching cost can increase. Similarly,
as the market for the offer grows, so may the opportunity cost to the firm of switching suppliers
and, hence, the incentive for suppliers to behave opportunistically. For example, the classic
7

We distinguish between industry life cycles (i.e.,the time span between an industry‟s emergence and its decline) and
technology life cycles (the time span between a technology generation‟s emergence and its decline). In this paper
our discussion is held at the level of the technology life cycle of specific technology generations, and hence at a
different level of analysis than the industry‟s broader evolution (e.g., Stigler, 1951).
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episode of General Motors and Fisher Body as discussed by Klein (1988, 2000) suggests that the
rapid increase in demand for closed metal bodies created significant contractual hazards for GM
and led GM to acquire Fisher Body.
Vertical integration mitigates the effects of behavioral uncertainty but not of technology
uncertainty. As the level of technology uncertainty decreases over the technology‟s life cycle, the
relative importance of behavioral uncertainty rises. Hence, the benefit from vertical integration
will be greater at later stages of the technology life cycle.

Hypothesis 3: The performance advantage from vertical integration will increase over the course
of the technology life cycle.

EMPIRICAL CONTEXT
We test our hypotheses in the context of the semiconductor lithography equipment
industry. Semiconductor lithography is a key process used by semiconductor manufacturers to
create integrated circuits. Improvements in lithography tools have been the main driver of
progress in semiconductor manufacturing, enabling the production of higher performance chips at
lower marginal cost (Moore, 1995). From its emergence in 1962 to 2005, the semiconductor
lithography industry has witnessed the commercialization of 9 different technological generations.
From the beginning, lithography tool manufacturers have regarded technology leadership to be a
key source of competitive advantage. Being among the first to introduce a new technology
generation offers technology leaders significant learning advantages as well as the opportunity to
lock in customers due to high switching costs.
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In each of the nine technology generations the manufacturers of lithography tools had to
overcome significant innovation challenges. Although suppliers and complementors were always
critical to enabling each new technology generation, the magnitude of their challenges varied
across generations – whereas in some generations it was possible to simply reuse existing
elements, other generations required suppliers and complementors to completely reinvent their
offers.

Semiconductor Lithography
Semiconductor lithography is the process by which a circuit design is imprinted on a
semiconductor wafer. The basic principle of lithography is illustrated in Figure 2. After the
design of an integrated circuit (IC) is finalized (i.e., the wiring, the gates and the junctions), the
circuit blueprint is transferred to a “mask”. The lithography process takes place when beams of
energy originating from an “energy source” are directed onto the mask. The pattern on the mask
allows a portion of the energy to pass through, with or without an optical “lens” system, onto the
wafer. The wafer is coated with an energy sensitive “resist”. The resist undergoes a chemical
reaction wherever the mask has allowed the energy to pass through. This chemical reaction
changes the structure of the resist and allows its selective removal from the wafer. Another
chemical process is then initiated in which the exposed parts of the wafer are etched. Finally, the
remaining resist is removed, creating a final circuit that replicates the initial design. A single
wafer can go through this process a number of times as multiple layers of circuits are etched on to
it. For example, in 2006, a one gigabit DRAM chip could be etched with as many as sixty circuit
layers.
(Insert Figure 2 about here)
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The key performance attribute of a lithography tool is its resolution, the smallest geometry
on which the tool can focus on the wafer surface. Resolution determines the extent of
miniaturization that can be achieved by the semiconductor manufacturer. A semiconductor
manufacturer will use scores of lithography tools in a single production line, often one for each
circuit layer. With modern tools costing over twenty million dollars each, investments in
lithography equipment represent a substantial portion of the cost of a fabrication facility.
Lithography “production recipes,” which are customized to specific tool models, masks and
resists, are regarded as a key source of advantage for semiconductor manufacturers, who invest
significant resources in optimizing their production lines (Iansiti, 1997). To maintain
competitiveness semiconductor manufacturers continuously reinvest in their facilities and look to
new tool generations to allow them to offer products with higher performance at lower cost.
In this study, our focal firms are the firms that design and assemble the lithography tool.
The key components that these tool makers need to integrate into their offers are the energy
source and the lens. Their customers are semiconductor manufacturers who use the lithography
tool in their fabrication plants. The mask and the resist are the key complements that these
customers must integrate with the lithography tool. A schema of the lithography tool ecosystem
is presented in Figure 3.
(Insert Figure 3 about here)

The development of a new generation of tool technology poses significant challenges for
tool manufacturers to achieve finer and finer resolutions. A new tool generation can also impose
significant challenges on other ecosystem elements: the energy source may need to operate at a
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new wavelength; the lens may need to be manufactured from a new material; the mask, which
needs to be etched with thinner lines, may need to be manufactured in a new way, possibly from
new materials; the chemical resist may need to be reformulated to allow for greater control of the
chemical reactions as energy wavelengths become smaller and geometric resolutions become
finer.
Despite undergoing nine generational transitions, the structure of interdependence in the
ecosystem – the components that need to be integrated by the focal tool manufacturers and the
complements that their customers, the semiconductor manufacturers, need to combine with the
tool offer – has remained unchanged throughout the forty-four year period that we study. All tool
manufacturers integrate the source and lens components and leave it to their customers to
integrate the mask and the resist complements with the tool. This choice of what to bundle and
what to exclude in the tool offer is rooted in a lack of synergies on both the supply- and demandsides. On the supply side, there is little overlap between the knowledge bases and resources
required to succeed in developing and assembling lithography tools (highly complex batch
assembly), creating new resists (producing vats of very specialized chemical solution) and mask
production (essentially a custom printing service business with a heavy consulting aspect). More
importantly, on the demand side, the big semiconductor manufacturers (the tool makers' most
important customers) have had little interest in fully bundled solutions – they regard their
proprietary production recipes for putting together tool, mask, and resist as a key source of their
own competitive advantage (Kapoor and Adner, 2008), and view a move to bundled lithography
solutions as inviting a loss of differentiation.8 Where firms have differed, is in their strategy for

8

Such stability in activity flows is a common characteristic across many industries. For example, automakers have
historically bundled the components of wheels and engines into their car leaving it to their customers to bundle the
car with fuel and roads. Similarly, disk drive producers have always bundled motors and heads; their customers, the
computer assemblers, bundle the drive with processors and software.
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managing their interdependence with components: some firms are vertically integrated into lens
production whereas others rely on external suppliers.
Thus, the industry allows us to examine a well defined technological ecosystem
comprised of focal firms, their suppliers, and their complementors, in which the location and
magnitude of ecosystem innovation challenges vary across technology generations. The industry
is also appealing because it provides a natural set of controls for two key factors that have already
been examined in the innovation literature. First, all the transitions across technology generations
can be characterized as sustaining innovations (non-disruptive in the Christensen, 1997 sense) in
that all technology generations were targeted at existing customers, enhanced performance on the
same set of key performance attributes (resolution, accuracy, and throughput, in particular), and
commanded significant price premiums over earlier generations. Second, the value of
complementary assets – sales force, manufacturing, brand, service and support competence –
were preserved throughout, such that the concerns of Mitchell (1989) and Tripsas (1997) are
essentially controlled for.

Technology Transitions in the Semiconductor Lithography Equipment Industry
The key measure of progress in semiconductor lithography is improvement in tool
resolution. Finer resolutions allow the semiconductor manufacturers to use the lithography tool
to pack more circuits onto a chip and more chips onto a wafer. These improvements allow
semiconductor manufacturers to offer chips with higher performance at lower marginal cost.
For the lithography tool manufacturers this means that improving resolution is a top
priority. Tool manufacturers increase resolution using a combination of three levers. The first is
to reduce the wavelength of light that is transmitted by the energy source. The second is to
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increase the size of the lens. The third is to improve the design of the tool itself. The industry
distinguishes among technology generations according to the design of the tool and the
wavelength of energy that it transmits. Incremental improvements to the tool design and the lens
are core drivers of advance within a technology generation. When further improvements become
untenable, due to a combination of physical and economic constraints, the industry shifts to a new
design or to a smaller wavelength, which heralds the emergence of a new lithography tool
generation.
In transitioning across technology generations, tool manufacturers always faced
significant design challenges.

Consider, for example, the industry‟s transition from I-line

steppers to DUV 248nm steppers. The core approach to increasing resolution in this transition
was to decrease the energy wavelength from 365nm to 248nm, which would allow tool resolution
to improve from 0.8µm to 0.45µm. The relationship between reduced wavelength and finer
resolution is straightforward in theory.9 Realizing this improvement in a commercial setting,
however, requires a corresponding improvement in tool design (e.g., in terms of factors such as
alignment, repeatability, reliability, and throughput). Overcoming these design challenges
requires tool manufacturers to experiment and iterate, often for years, in order to come up with a
suitable offer (Henderson and Clark, 1990).10
When a new tool generation requires innovation in components, the tool manufacturers
face greater challenges in specifying, sourcing, and integrating the new components into their
9

The resolution capability of lithography technologies that employ a lens system is given by the Rayleigh criterion:
Resolution = k1 x (Wavelength/Numerical Aperture)
where wavelength is the wavelength of the light being transmitted by the source, numerical aperture is the measure of
the size of the lens, and k1 is a process-specific constant.
10
Henderson‟s studies of the industry have highlighted that in confronting new technology generations firms may
face both engineering challenges in creating new designs, as well as cognitive challenges in recognizing the
subtleties of change (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Henderson, 1993). In particular, she highlighted the unique
cognitive challenges that confront incumbents when generational changes affect the architectural links among only
core design concepts. The focus of our paper is on external challenges; however, we account for incumbency effects
in our empirical specification.
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designs. The transition to DUV 248nm, for example, required fundamental changes in the energy
source and the lens. Mercury lamps, which had been used in all earlier generations, were not able
to provide sufficient energy at a wavelength of 248nm to cause adequate chemical reactions in the
resist. This challenge was overcome by the development of excimer lasers using Krypton
Fluoride (KrF) gas. The conventional glass material that had been used to make lenses faced
absorption problems with the 248nm wavelength. The only material that could be used was fused
silica, and this required major changes to the lens manufacturing process. These required
changes created significant challenges in components, which, in turn, served to increase the
design and integration challenges that confronted the tool manufacturers.
In order for the new generation tools to be used effectively, significant challenges needed
to be overcome in the development of the complements as well. Mask makers needed a new
material that would provide improved transmission of the new wavelength which, in turn,
required changes to the mask manufacturing process. Finally, the existing novolac resists could
not absorb enough energy from the 248nm wavelength to cause an adequate chemical reaction.
To solve this challenge, a new chemically-amplified resist had to be developed.
Table 1 summarizes the major technological innovations required to overcome the
challenges in the tool, lens, source, mask, and resist in each technology generation. A more
detailed overview of each of the technology transitions is presented in Appendix I.

(Insert Table 1 about here)
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METHODOLOGY
Data
We used both primary and secondary data sources for this study. We began by
developing a detailed historical understanding of the semiconductor lithography equipment
industry during a 20-month field study. We conducted multiple interviews with over thirty
industry experts, most of whom have been associated with the industry for more than twenty
years. The interviewees came from a variety of positions within the ecosystem: tool makers,
semiconductor manufacturers, suppliers, complementors, industry associations, and consultants.
The interviews were semi-structured and lasted two hours on average. We identified ecosystem
structure by asking first, what elements needed to be integrated by tool manufacturers in order for
them to produce their offers; and second, what elements needed to be integrated by the tool
customers in order for the tool to be used productively. There was unanimous agreement that the
energy source and the lens were the key components to be integrated into the tool by the
manufacturer, and that the mask and the resist were the key complements to be integrated with
the tool by the customer. We used the information from the interviews to develop an
understanding of the ecosystem challenges that governed the emergence of the different
technology generations. We consolidated this information in a document that mirrors Table 1 and
sent it back to our interviewees for written and verbal comments. We incorporated these
comments and then sent the table out for a second review. All the experts agreed with our final
characterization. In addition, we used our field work to develop a list of keywords that we used
to guide the article search that we used to create our measures of component and complement
challenges. 11

11

The keywords were: lithography, microphotographs, mask, photomask, resist, laser, UV, DUV, Deep UV, optical,
lens, stepper, aligner, mercury, illuminator, exposure, printer and the names of the different generations
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We searched every issue of Solid State Technology from 1961 to 2001 for articles relating
to ecosystem innovation challenges. Solid State Technology is a leading industry journal whose
mission is to cover the key trends and issues that confront the industry. It has been publishing
technical articles on challenges facing the semiconductor industry since its founding. Using this
source, we created measures (discussed below) that characterize the extent of challenges in the
key components and complements for each of the technology generations.
Finally, we obtained detailed market data from the leading industry consulting firm, VLSI
Research, which has been following the industry since early 1970‟s. The VLSI data included
sales by technology generation for every firm that competed in the lithography equipment
industry from 1974 to 2005. Rebecca Henderson generously shared her data on the contact
printing generation. Our final data set consists of an unbalanced panel of 64 firm-technology
generations. The average number of observations per group is 10.4. Our data is comprehensive
and includes information on each of the 33 firms that ever sold a semiconductor lithography
tool.12

Variables
The definitions of the variables used to test our hypotheses are summarized in Table 2 and
detailed below.
(Insert Table 2 about here)

12

In our analysis we exclude 2 firms from our sample because, although they produced lithography tools, they were
competing in different markets. These firms entered the given lithography generation during its declining phase and
were targeting niche markets such as thin film heads, pressure sensors, and biotech applications rather than the
mainstream applications of semiconductor manufacturers.
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Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable, generation share, is a firm‟s market share in a given technology
generation in a given year. This measure is consistent with prior studies that examine firm
performance in new technology generations (e.g., Mitchell, 1991; Henderson, 1993; Tripsas,
1997). Further, industry participants and observers (e.g., VLSI Research, Gartner Dataquest)
regularly use market share in a generation as a measure of firm success.
In our main analysis we consider a firm‟s market share in a given technology generation
in a given year. As a test of robustness for hypotheses 1 and 2, reported in Appendix II, we also
consider a firm‟s cumulative market share over the entire life of the technology generation.

Independent Variables
Our measures of component and complement challenges were created using a count of
Solid State Technology articles. Our industry sources confirmed that a count of published articles
that address technical problems regarding an ecosystem element is a good proxy for the level of
technology challenges that surrounded the development of different lithography generations. We
identified a total of 181 lithography related articles that appeared from 1961 to 2001. We then
identified articles that discussed ecosystem challenges in a given generation. We used the article
titles to identify the match between the generation and the ecosystem element. If insufficient
information was available in the title, we read the abstract and the conclusion to ascertain if the
article addressed the innovation challenges in the ecosystem for a given generation. This
reduced our set to 102 articles.
Finally, since our primary concern is with respect to innovation challenges that confront
technology leaders as they pioneer new technology generations, we further reduced our set to
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include only those articles that were published no later than 5 years after the commercialization of
the first tool in a generation. Another reason to choose the 5 year post-commercialization
window was to present a balanced view of upstream and downstream ecosystem challenges. The
articles that were published after the close of this 5-year window were almost entirely dedicated
to discussing complement challenges. This is not surprising, since by the 5th postcommercialization year, much progress would have necessarily been made on the component side.
We tested robustness with 3- and 7-year windows and the results are consistent with the ones
reported here. A small subset of articles compared the ecosystem innovation challenges for
different generations, and for these articles we read the relevant sections for each generation in
order to create a match. This reduced the set to 56 articles that discussed 78 ecosystem
innovation challenges.
We constructed the Component Challenge measure as the sum of the number of articles
that discussed innovation challenges in the lens (Innovlg) and the source (Innovsg) for technology
generation g. 13

Component Challengeg = Innovlg + Innovsg

Similarly, Complement Challenge was constructed as the sum of the number of articles
that discussed innovation challenges in the resist (Innovrg) and the mask (Innovmg).

Complement Challengeg = Innovrg + Innovmg

13

As validation of the article count measure, we tested its consistency with the qualitative descriptions revealed in
our interviews and reported in Table 1. We coded the entries and non-entries in Table 1with values of one and zero
respectively, and then compared them to the article count data. The correlation is 0.91 for source, 0.83 for lens, 0.92
for mask and 0.89 for resist innovation challenges. This high correlation increases our confidence in the measure.
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We measure a firm‟s Technology Leadership as the time of its entry into a new
technology generation relative to its rivals. We define entry as the first occurrence of revenue for
a firm in a given generation. The first firm to enter the generation was assigned a technology
leadership value of 1. Subsequent firms were assigned values with reference to the years elapsed
since the first entrant (e.g., a firm entering a generation three years after the leader was assigned a
technology leadership value of 4).
To assess the effects of vertical integration on firm performance we construct the variable
Vertical Integration. The variable takes a value of 1 if the firm produced its own lens component
in a given technology generation and 0 otherwise. During the history of the industry no tool
manufacturer produced its own energy source.
We defined the variable Technology Maturity as the number of years that have lapsed
since the first commercial sale of a tool in the given technology generation, where the first year of
commercial sales is coded as 1.

Control Variables
We control for a number of firm and industry level effects. The prior literature (e.g.,
Henderson and Clark, 1990) has identified important differences between incumbents and
entrants during regimes of technological change. We controlled for this effect using the variable
Incumbent, which takes a value of 1 if a firm had sold lithography tools in an earlier technology
generation.
We controlled for firm size through the variable Conglomerate, which takes a value of 1 if
the firm was active in industries other than semiconductor manufacturing equipment and 0
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otherwise. We have two industry level controls. The first is Generation Sales Growth, a measure
of change in tool sales (in dollars) in a given generation in a given year, which represent the
growth opportunities that may influence choices regarding investment in new technology
generations. The second is Number of Firms, which controls for the competitive density in the
generation in a given year.

Statistical Analysis
We use panel data for our empirical analysis. The use of panel data helps to control for
potential sources of unobserved heterogeneity and allows us to test how the benefits of vertical
integration change over time during the course of a given generation. While both the random and
the fixed effects models allow for explicit consideration of the unobserved firm effect, the
random effects model makes an additional assumption that the unobserved firm effect is
uncorrelated with the independent variables. Although a fixed-effects approach would require
fewer assumptions than the random-effects approach, it cannot be used if the explanatory
variables do not vary within the experimental group (Baltagi, 2005; 13). In our analysis
component challenges and complement challenges are the key explanatory variables, but they do
not exhibit inter-temporal variation for a firm within a given generation. For this reason, we use a
random effects model. As discussed by Wooldridge (2002), in a random effects estimation, we
can attempt to control for unobserved differences across firms by including firm dummies. Hence,
we test our hypotheses using a random effects model and include both firm and year dummies as
controls for unobserved firm- and year-specific effects. We estimate the following equation:

yigt = β0 + Xigtβ + Diλ + Ttδ + aig + uigt
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where yigt is firm i‟s market share in a generation g in year t; Xigt is the vector of independent and
control variables; Di is the vector of dummies for each firm; Tt is the vector of dummies for each
year; aig is the unobserved heterogeneity for a firm in a generation that is assumed to be
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables; and uigt is the error term.
As a further test of robustness for Hypotheses 1 and 2, in Appendix II we include a cross
sectional OLS specification in which the dependent variable is the firm‟s cumulative market share
in a generation (total firms sales in generationg / total sales in generationg).14

RESULTS
Descriptive Relationships
Figure 4 illustrates the varying degrees of component and complement challenges in each
of the nine technology generations. As can be seen from the figure, each of the technology
generations presented a distinct combination of ecosystem challenges. This is a key source of
variance that we exploit in this study.

(Insert Figure 4 about here)

14

As an additional test of robustness for hypotheses 1 and 2, to help assure that our observed effects are not due a
firm endogeneity bias, we reconfigured our panel data from grouping by "firm in a generation" to grouping by "firm".
This specification allowed us to estimate a traditional fixed effects specification. However it required that we rightcensor observations of firms‟ participation in older generations beginning in the year in which they introduce their
new generation offers (because the panel can only have one observation per firm per year). In addition, because the
fixed effects estimation requires temporal variance within a panel, it effectively excludes firms that participated in
only one technology generation. These exclusions reduced the number of observations from 676 to 406. The results
of this more conservative test, available from the authors. are fully consistent with those presented here. Because the
right censoring required for estimating this specification precludes us from testing hypothesis 3, we report the
random effects model with firm and year dummies in the main results.
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The descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the variables used in the study are
presented in Table 3. The significant negative correlation between technology leadership (where
lower values indicate earlier entry timing) and generation share suggests that early entry is
rewarded with higher market share in the semiconductor lithography equipment market. Since
component challenges and complement challenges are moderately correlated, we enter these
variables into separate models to alleviate concerns regarding multicollinearity.

(Insert Table 3 about here)

Tests of the Hypotheses
Our hypotheses predict the impact of external ecosystem challenges on the performance
advantage that accrues to technology leaders, and the impact of vertical integration decisions on
this performance over the course of the technology life cycle. We test Hypotheses 1 and 2 by
interacting firms‟ technology leadership with measures of ecosystem challenges. We meancenter the variables in the interaction terms. The mean-centering of continuous variables helps to
reduce potential multicollinearity and facilitates the interpretation of the estimated coefficients
(Aiken and West, 1991). We test Hypothesis 3 by interacting firms‟ vertical integration status
with the generation‟s technology maturity. Consistent with prior studies examining market share
performance in new technology generations (e.g. Henderson, 1993; Tripsas, 1997), we use a
semi-log specification to test our hypotheses.
Table 4 reports our regression results. Model 1 is our baseline model. Consistent with
conventional wisdom in the industry, the coefficient for technology leadership is significant and
negative, indicating benefits to technology leadership. We find that incumbency has a negative
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effect, which is consistent with Henderson‟s (1993) findings in her study of the industry. The
coefficient for vertical integration is significant and positive, suggesting that in-house component
manufacturing is a source of advantage in this industry.

The coefficient for complement

challenge is significant and positive. While not hypothesized, this finding indicates that high
complement challenges may increase the market share of an average firm. Since average firms
are technology followers, this is consistent with the mechanisms that underlie Hypothesis 2.
Among the industry level controls, the coefficient for number of firms is negative and significant,
confirming the negative effects of competitive density on firms‟ market share performance.
In Model 2 we interact technology leadership with component challenge to test
Hypothesis 1. In Model 3 we interact technology leadership with complement challenge to test
Hypothesis 2. In Model 4 we interact vertical integration with technology maturity to test
Hypothesis 3. Model 5 is the fully specified model.

(Insert Table 4 about here)

In Hypothesis 1 we predicted that greater component challenges will increase the
performance advantage accorded to technology leaders. The hypothesis is supported in Models 2
and 5. The coefficient of the interaction term between technology leadership and component
challenge is negative and significant. Hence, the greater the challenges in components, the
greater the benefits that accrue to technology leaders.
In Hypothesis 2 we predicted that greater complement challenges will decrease the
performance advantage accorded to technology leaders. The hypothesis is supported in Models 3
and 5. The coefficient of the interaction term between technology leadership and complement
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challenge is positive and significant. Hence, complement challenges in the firms‟ ecosystem
erodes the benefits that accrue to technology leaders.
In Hypothesis 3 we predicted that the advantage from vertical integration will increase
over the course of the technology life cycle. The positive and significant coefficient of the
interaction term between vertical integration and technology maturity in Models 4 and 5 supports
the hypothesis.
We tested the robustness of our results in a number a ways. First, as a test of robustness
for Hypotheses 1 and 2, we include in Appendix II results from a cross sectional specification
estimated using OLS regression for a firm‟s cumulative market share in a given generation. The
results are fully consistent with our predictions.
Second, we considered the X-ray and E-beam generations as possible anomalies. These
were the only technology generations not to achieve market dominance even in their peak sales
years. This however, was only evident ex post. Ex ante, these two generations had garnered very
strong interest and support among industry participants, who believed that these generations
represented the future of lithography technology. As a robustness test, we present Model 6 in
Table 4, which excluded the X-ray and E-beam technology generations and whose results are
fully consistent with our predictions.
Finally, we split component and complement challenges into their individual elements of
source, lens, mask and resist to make sure that our results are not driven by a specific element.
Again, the results are fully consistent with the predictions.

33

DISCUSSION
Successful innovation depends on a firm‟s ability to resolve the uncertainties that
surround the development and production of its offer. These challenges have long been a focus
of both the academic and applied innovation literatures. We note, however, that the literature‟s
overwhelming focus has been on the management of firms‟ internal innovation challenges. In
this paper we have explicitly focused on the neglected role of external challenges in driving
innovators‟ outcomes.
In considering external innovation challenges, we present a structured framework to
distinguish between those challenges whose resolution depends on suppliers and those whose
resolution depends on complementors. We find that, depending on their location, challenges in
the external ecosystem can either enhance or erode a firm‟s competitive advantage from
technology leadership. Specifically, we find that while the advantage from technology leadership
increases with component challenges, it decreases with complement challenges. Challenges in
components increase the technology leader‟s competitive advantage by increasing the potential
for learning and by increasing barriers to imitation. In contrast, challenges in complements
reduce the technology leader‟s competitive advantage by slowing its advance down the learning
curve and increasing opportunities for rivals to catch up.
Figure 5 uses the estimates from Model 5 to plot the effect of technology leadership on
firms‟ market share performance for different combinations of ecosystem challenges. The
vertical axis is the difference in average annual market share between the technology leader, who
enters the generation in year 1, and a follower, who enters in a later year. The horizontal axis is
the follower‟s year of entry. We plot three component-complement uncertainty scenarios, where
high (low) corresponds to a +1 (-1) standard deviation above (below) our sample mean. The
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baseline case, “low component-, low complement- challenge” shows a downward sloping curve,
indicating that when ecosystem challenges are low the technology leader is advantaged relative to
the follower. As discussed above, this is highly consistent with well established industry beliefs.
In the case of “high component-, low complement- challenge” we find that the slope is even more
negative, indicating that technology leaders enjoy an even greater competitive advantage. To get
a sense for the economic magnitude of these differences, consider that in 2004 a 1% market share
difference in the DUV 248 generation corresponded to $28.7 million in sales. Finally, in the “low
component-, high complement- challenge” case we find a weakly upward sloping curve. This
indicates that when complement challenges are high, technology leadership is less beneficial;
indeed, in our specific context, we find that the leader is at a slight disadvantage to later followers.
(Insert Figure 5 about here)

The implication of Figure 5, as an illustrative summary of our arguments and findings, for
the debates regarding early mover advantages is a strong one.

Moving beyond the debate of

existence vs. non existence of first mover advantages (e.g., Golder and Tellis, 1991; Leiberman
and Montgomery, 1988, 1998), we have identified specific contingencies that determine the value
of technology leadership. Further, the mechanisms that we identify regarding the opposing
effects of component and complement challenges expand the analysis of first mover advantage
beyond the traditional firm-centered focus to incorporate specific features of the external
environment.
Beyond environmental contingency, we also examine vertical integration as a strategy for
managing ecosystem challenges. We argue that when contracting with suppliers for innovative
components, the focal firm faces two specific kinds of uncertainty. The first is the technological
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uncertainty surrounding whether and when suppliers will discover appropriate solutions to their
own development challenges. The second is the behavioral uncertainty regarding whether and
when suppliers will behave opportunistically to renegotiate agreements and reset terms in their
own favor. We note that while technology uncertainty is resolved and reduced over the course of
the technology lifecycle, behavioral uncertainty does not necessarily decrease over time. This
asymmetry suggests that the balance between technology uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty
will tend to tilt towards the latter over time. As such, we argue and find that the benefits derived
from vertical integration increase over the course of the technology life cycle. This finding is
consistent with recent studies conducted in the context of the automotive industry (Argyres and
Bigelow, 2007; Novak and Stern, 2008).
Distinguishing between innovation challenges that lie upstream and downstream of a focal
firm reveals important asymmetries in their effect on the firm‟s ability to create value with its
offer. The impact of upstream component challenges, which prevent the firm from offering its
innovation to the market, are qualitatively different from downstream complement challenges,
which prevent the focal firm‟s customers from utilizing the innovation to its full potential.
Whereas the former constitute barriers to production, the latter are barriers to adoption. Although
both result in bottlenecks to value creation, they have opposite effects on the firm‟s ability to
capture value and create competitive advantage. This finding supports recent calls in the
literature that argue for the importance of understanding the dynamics of value creation as a
precursor to the analysis of value capture (e.g., Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996; Adner and
Zemsky, 2006).
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This study, of course, has a number of limitations. First, it explores a single industry,
raising questions of generalizability. Second, it does not have a direct measure of focal firms‟
innovation challenges.
Our field interviews indicate that these were consistently high across generations, but that
. They did, however vary depending on While we have taken care in our estimation and
included firm and year dummies to account for unobserved differences across firms and time
periods, there are several potential concerns with respect to endogeneity. We have taken a
number of steps to alleviate these

This study, of course, has a number of limitations. While we have taken care in our
estimation and included firm and year dummies to account for unobserved differences across
firms and time periods, there are several potential concerns with respect to endogeneity. First,
our focus is on the effect of component and complement challenges that arise during technology
transitions. During these transitions focal firms also faced innovation challenges in their core
activities, but due to non-availability of data we were unable to measure their extent. This
omission could bias our results if focal innovation challenges were correlated with external
challenges. However, descriptive evidence suggests that there is no systematic correlation
between the core innovation challenge and challenges in components and complements. For
example, in the proximity generation, while the tool manufacturers faced significant challenges in
designing and manufacturing the new architecture, there were no major changes required
anywhere else in the ecosystem. For completeness, we do control for the fact that incumbents are
likely to face greater challenges across the technological transitions than entrants as discussed by
Henderson and Clark (1990) and find support for this argument. Second, it is possible that
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vertically integrated firms may systematically enter a generation late and ramp up much faster
than their non-integrated rivals. We checked for this possibility by comparing the technology
leadership values for integrated with those of non-integrated firms. We did not find a significant
difference between the two sub-groups (t = 0.90, p = 0.37). In addition, we performed a
robustness test by excluding the data for the first two years of each firm‟s participation in a new
technology generation. In our context, the first two years are typically characterized by ramp-up
challenges. Our predicted relationship continued to be significant. Third, we characterize the
location relationships among ecosystem actors, but we have no visibility as to the history and
nature of specific exchange relationships among these actors, and how these might affect their
interactions (e.g., Argyres and Liebeskind, 2002). Future studies could address these limitations
by incorporating how actors coordinate, through mechanisms such as alliances, and relational
contracts, within the context of innovation ecosystems. Finally, this study is conducted in the
context of a single industry, such that its replication in other contexts would extend its
generalizability.
This study has presented an ecosystem lens to examine the conditions under which
technology leadership yields competitive advantage. We have argued and shown that the benefit
of technology leadership depends on both the location and the magnitude of uncertainty within
the ecosystem. We have examined the effectiveness of vertical integration as a strategy to
manage ecosystem uncertainty and have identified the impact of the technology lifecycle in
determining its benefits.
Ecosystem settings raise a new set of issues for both researchers and managers to
consider. Choices regarding both business model design and organization design need to be
revisited in the light of joint value creation. Questions regarding development incentives
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(Cassadesus-Masanell and Yoffie, 2005), positioning and coordination choices (Iansiti and
Levien, 2004; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002), customer expectations (Tripsas, 2006; Adner, 2004),
and value chain configuration (Jacobides and Billinger, 2006) all become more visible and more
important in the context of ecosystems. We hope that our framework and analysis can offer
additional avenues through which such questions can be fruitfully addressed.
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TABLE 1: Major technological innovations by the lithography equipment ecosystem to overcome the challenges
accompanying new technology generations.
Technology
Generation
(Year of First
Sale)

Resolu
tion
(µm)

Tool

Initial Solution
(pre-1962)

Contact Printer
(1962)

Proximity Printer
(1972)
Projection
Scanner
(1973)
E-Beam Writer
(1976)

X-Ray Printer
(1978)

G-Line Stepper
(1978)

7.00

3.00

2.00

0.5

0.3

1.25

Circuit design is transferred to wafer by
putting mask in direct contact with the
resist on the wafer and then shining the
light energy from the mercury lamp
energy
source.
The
mask
is separated from the wafer by a
small gap. Eliminating direct contact
reduces defect rates.
A reflective lens system is incorporated
into the tool to allow for greater
concentration of light energy to be
transferred through the mask onto the
wafer. an electron beam through a
Move
preprogrammed path to create the circuit
pattern directly on the resist without use
of lens or mask.
Change wavelength from 435nm to 10nm
and project energy from an x-ray source
without use of a lens.
Step-and-repeat technology allows a
single wafer to be etched through multiple
exposures as the mask is shifted across the
wafer in steps. A refractive lens system
allows for the circuit dimensions on the
mask to be 5-10 times larger than the
dimensions etched onto the wafer.

Source

Lens

Mask

Resist

Mercury Lamp

None

Manually cut mask

Negative resist

-

-

Introduction of Step &
Repeat Camera for
mask making.

-

-

-

Substitution of
emulsion plates by
-chrome on glass.

-

Development of
Reflective lens
system.

Use of Electron Beam
systems for high quality
1X masks

-

-

-

New developments with
PMMA based resist

Development
of thermionic
and field
emission
methods and
Development
final
of
synchrotron
convergence
for
providingto
a
Schottky
high energy
emitter.
source.
-

-

Development of
Refractive lens
system.

Development of new
mask materials such as
SiC/Ta.
Development of new
mask making
-techniques to provide
smaller geometries.

-

-

Change in resist from
standard Negative resist
to Novolac resist to
provide low resolution.

43

I-Line Stepper
(1985)

0.80

Wavelength derived from the mercury
lamp energy source is reduced from
435nm to 365nm.

Wavelength is reduced from 365nm to
248nm.
DUV 248nm
Stepper
(1986)
DUV 193nm
Stepper
(1996)

0.45

Wavelength is reduced from 365nm to
248nm.
0.15

-

Development of
new lens material
for reduced
wavelength.

-

-

Development
of Krypton
Fluoride (KrF)
excimer laser.

Change in lens
material to Fused
Silica.

Change in mask
material to quartz.

Change in resist to
chemically amplified
resist.

Development
of Argon
Fluoride (ArF)
excimer laser.

Change in lens
material to Calcium
Fluoride

Introduction of RET
Masks for 193nm.

New versions of
chemically amplified
resist were developed
for 193nm wavelength.
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TABLE 2: Variable descriptions.

Variables

Description

Dependent Variable
Generation Share

Firm‟s market share in a given generation in a given year.

Key Variables in Study

Technology Leadership

Entry timing for the firm in the new generation. Leadership position is
defined as 1 for the first entrant and subsequent entry is measured with
respect to the lag in years from the first entry.

Component Challenge

Number of technical articles appearing in the industry journal no later
than 5 years after the emergence of the new generation that refer to lens
and source innovation in the given generation.

Complement Challenge

Number of technical articles appearing in the industry journal no later
than 5 years after the emergence of the new generation that refer to mask
and resist innovation in the given generation.

Vertical Integration

Dummy = 1 for a firm with a separate business unit performing
manufacturing of lens component for the generation.

Technology Maturity

Count of number of years between a technology generation‟s year of first
sale and the given year.

Control Variables
Incumbent

Dummy = 1 for a firm that sold lithography tools in an earlier technology
generation.

Conglomerate

Dummy = 1 for a firm that was active in multiple industries.

Generation Sales Growth

Annual sales growth rate of the generation.

Number of Firms

Number of firms active in the generation in a given year.
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TABLE 3: Descriptive statistics and correlations.

Variables

Mean

1

Ln(Generation Share)

-1.83

Std.
Dev.
1.26

2

Technology Leadership*Component Challenge

-0.64

7.69

3

Technology Leadership*Complement Challenge

1.90

4

Vertical integration*Technology Maturity
a

Min

Max

1

2

3

-6.21

0.00

-30.18

22.91

-0.05

8.79

-22.47

32.71

0.24

-0.20

2.66

5.63

0.00

27.00

0.23

0.10

-0.02

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

5

Technology Leadership

3.55

2.93

1.00

13.00

-0.35

-0.34

0.24

-0.07

6

Component Challengea

3.57

2.44

0.00

8.00

-0.03

-0.01

-0.36

0.09

-0.09

7

Complement Challengea

4.13

2.67

0.00

10.00

0.13

-0.38

0.09

-0.15

0.24

0.32

8

Vertical Integration

0.23

0.42

0.00

1.00

0.22

0.10

-0.03

0.85

-0.12

0.15

-0.13

9

Incumbent

0.48

0.50

0.00

1.00

-0.05

0.03

-0.26

0.28

0.15

0.39

0.06

0.31

10

Conglomerate

0.49

0.50

0.00

1.00

0.23

0.07

-0.08

0.48

-0.34

0.23

-0.10

0.56

0.21

11

Generation Sales Growth

40.78

106.11

-76.02

874.05

-0.07

0.06

-0.03

-0.08

-0.09

0.12

0.06

0.04

0.10

0.03

12

Number of Firms

4.92

2.38

1.00

11.00

-0.45

0.07

-0.19

-0.03

-0.03

0.06

-0.17

0.00

-0.09

0.06

0.10

13

Technology Maturity

11.26

6.68

1.00

32.00

0.16

-0.10

0.18

0.23

0.22

-0.15

-0.12

0.01

-0.11

-0.01

-0.33

12

-0.24

N=676, Correlations greater than 0.08 are significant at p < 0.05
a
Variable is mean-centered (mean, min and max are shown for the pre-centered values)
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TABLE 4: Coefficient estimates from panel regression. Dependent Variable = Ln(Generation Share)
Model 1
Technology Leadership*Component Challenge

Model 2
-0.040***
(0.009)

Technology Leadership*Complement Challenge

Model 3

0.022**
(0.009)

Vertical integration*Technology Maturity
Technology Leadership
Vertical integration
Component Challenge
Complement Challenge
Technology Maturity
Incumbent
Conglomerate
Generation Sales Growth
Number of Firms
Constant
Firm Dummies
Year Dummies
R2- within
R2- between
R2- overall
Observations

Model 4

-0.146***
(0.022)
0.406***
(0.156)
-0.036
(0.047)
0.102***
(0.025)
0.003
(0.017)
-0.609***
(0.124)
0.875
(0.585)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.183***
(0.020)
-1.066
(0.867)
Included
Included
0.17
0.77
0.58
676

-0.148***
(0.019)
0.245
(0.151)
-0.045
(0.044)
0.074***
(0.022)
-0.025
(0.018)
-0.757***
(0.127)
-0.215
(0.579)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.181***
(0.020)
0.194
(0.951)
Included
Included
0.17
0.83
0.61
676

-0.163***
(0.020)
0.398**
(0.156)
-0.001
(0.048)
0.086***
(0.024)
0.014
(0.017)
-0.423***
(0.144)
0.397
(0.541)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.179***
(0.020)
-1.393
(0.860)
Included
Included
0.17
0.78
0.60
676

0.034**
(0.016)
-0.142***
(0.022)
0.047
(0.231)
-0.052
(0.049)
0.104***
(0.025)
-0.011
(0.019)
-0.658***
(0.127)
2.845***
(0.310)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.189***
(0.020)
-3.190***
(0.613)
Included
Included
0.19
0.77
0.59
676

Model 5
-0.042***
(0.009)
0.020**
(0.008)
0.041***
(0.016)
-0.158***
(0.018)
-0.205
(0.227)
-0.033
(0.047)
0.061***
(0.023)
-0.033
(0.020)
-0.655***
(0.151)
2.697***
(0.355)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.184***
(0.020)
-2.407***
(0.655)
Included
Included
0.19
0.83
0.62
676

Model 6a
-0.044***
(0.013)
0.020*
(0.011)
0.029*
(0.017)
-0.156***
(0.024)
0.012
(0.281)
-0.035
(0.115)
0.028
(0.031)
-0.029
(0.040)
-0.769***
(0.253)
2.812***
(0.447)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.178***
(0.024)
-2.401**
(1.126)
Included
Included
0.19
0.83
0.62
521

Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered for intra-panel correlation, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a
Model 6 excludes observations from X-ray and E-beam generations.
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Figure 1: Generic Schema of an Ecosystem.
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Figure 2: Basic Schema of the Semiconductor Lithography Process.
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Figure 3: The Semiconductor Lithography Equipment Ecosystem.
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Figure 4: Distribution of challenges among ecosystem elements in nine semiconductor
lithography equipment generations.
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Market Share Difference Between
Technology Leader and Followers

Figure 5: Difference in expected market share between a technology leader and a follower
as a function of ecosystem challenge and the follower’s entry timing.

0.00%

Low Component Low Complement
Challenge
Low Component High Complement
Challenge

-10.00%

High Component Low Complement
Challenge
-20.00%
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Entry Timing (Years)

50

Appendix I: Technology Transitions in the Semiconductor Lithography Equipment
Industry from 1962 to 2005
This discussion is based on the industry history presented in Kapoor and Adner (2007).
Optical Technologies
Optical lithography technologies use light of different wavelengths to create patterns on the
semiconductor substrate. These technologies have been dominant in the industry despite repeated expectations for
their substitution (see Henderson, 1995 for an intriguing discussion).
Contact Printers – Contact printing was the earliest and the simplest of the lithography technologies to be
commercialized. The modifier „contact‟ corresponds to the fact that the mask and the semiconductor wafer were
in direct contact with each other. The contact printers in the 1960‟s included a stage system for securing the mask
and the wafer, and an alignment unit that ensured that the patterns from the mask were accurately transferred to the
wafer. They used a mercury lamp for their energy source, an existing component already used in movie projectors
of the time. Contact printers did not incorporate a lens. The resist used by semiconductor firms as a complement
to the tool, known as negative resist, was readily available and already being used by Kodak in photography
applications.
The main ecosystem challenge to the emergence of commercial contact printers stemmed from difficulties
in the manufacture of suitable masks. Masks were made using a three stage process. First the desired circuit
pattern was cut from a plastic laminate. This cutting was done using a manually operated tool which could achieve
an accuracy of approximately 100µm (0.1mm). Second, the circuit image was etched on to an emulsion plate
which became the „master‟ mask. Finally, the master mask was used to create copies of itself which served as
„production‟ masks.
This early mask making process presented two inherent limitations. First, the resolution of the manually
cut masks acted to limit the performance achievable by the contact printers. Second, the master mask was highly
susceptible to wear during the production mask making process, which led to high manufacturing defects and
hence reduced productivity.
To address these challenges, the mask making industry introduced two new innovations during the 1960‟s.
The first was the computerization and automation of the mask making process using high-speed step and repeat
cameras. The second was the introduction of master masks made of chrome patterned glass that could be cleaned
and reused several times, reducing the defects in the production masks.
Proximity Printers – A primary disadvantage of contact printing was low process yield. This was due to
the damage inflicted on the mask and the wafers as they were repeatedly brought in and out of physical contact
with each other during the lithography process. Proximity printing, introduced in 1972, offered a way to overcome
this problem. With proximity printing the mask and the wafer were separated by a tiny gap in order to reduce the
defects that had been caused by their direct contact. This reconfiguration allowed for significant enhancement in
resolution, achieving geometries of 3µm. As discussed in detail by Henderson and Clark (1990), this generational
transition can be characterized as an architectural innovation and imposed significant innovation challenges on the
focal lithography equipment firms. The transition to proximity printing did not, however, present major innovation
challenges to any other actors in the lithography ecosystem.
Projection Scanners – The continuous need of semiconductor manufacturers to reduce circuit dimensions
and get better manufacturing yields led to the introduction of another architectural innovation in 1974. Projection
scanners introduced the use of lens systems as a component in lithography tools. The lens system was composed
of a series of reflective mirrors which allowed the image of the mask to be transferred to the wafer. Projection
scanners allowed for resolution as low as 2µm. The ecosystem challenges during the development and emergence
of this generation were in the lens system, a new component that was developed specifically for the lithography
industry; and in the mask, which needed to be etched with correspondingly smaller geometries and greater
accuracy. To meet the mask manufacturing challenge, mask makers switched from using step and repeat cameras
to using electron beam systems in their production process.
G-line Steppers – Step-and-repeat (stepper) technology was introduced in 1978. The G-line stepper, an
architectural innovation, introduced two key modifications. First, light was projected through the mask on to the
wafer using a refractive lens system (as opposed to the reflective lens system used in projection scanners). Second,
the light was projected on only a part of the wafer at any one time; the mask was shifted across the wafer in steps,
such that multiple exposures are made across the wafer to complete the lithography process. G-line steppers
operated at a wavelength of 435 nanometer (nm) and allowed users to achieve resolution as low as 1.25µm. The

51

transition to G-line steppers imposed significant challenges on the ecosystem. In terms of components, it required
the development of a refractive lens comprised of several precise glass elements that would minimize distortion
and transmit light accurately on to the wafer. In terms of complements, the transition to G-line steppers required
the development of a resist that would allow for sufficiently small geometries; that is, a resist in which exposure to
light energy would trigger a chemical reaction only in the molecules that were directly exposed to the light,
without setting off a reaction in adjacent molecules. The negative resist, which had been used to this point in the
industry‟s evolution, was inadequate to the task. The resist challenge was resolved through the development of
new novolac-based materials.
I-line Steppers –I-line steppers, introduced in 1985, used light with a wavelength of 365nm to improve
over the resolution achievable with the G-line generation.15 The main ecosystem challenge was to develop a lens
that would transmit light at the lower wavelength. This required the development of a new glass material and
corresponding changes to the lens production process. The remaining ecosystem elements required only
incremental changes for the transition from the G-line generation. I-line steppers allowed for resolutions as low as
0.8µm.
DUV 248nm Steppers – The next step in the industry‟s technology evolution was the introduction of DUV
248nm steppers in 1988. This generation entailed a further reduction in wavelength into the deep ultraviolet
(DUV) spectrum at 248nm. The reduction in wavelength required fundamental changes in the energy source, the
lens, the mask, and the resist.
Mercury lamps, which had been used in all earlier generations, were not able to provide sufficient energy
at a wavelength of 248nm to cause adequate chemical reactions in the resist. This challenge was overcome by the
development of excimer lasers using Krypton Fluoride (KrF) gas. The conventional glass material that was used to
make lenses faced absorption problems with 248nm wavelength. The only material that could be used was fused
silica, and this required major changes to the lens manufacturing process. The challenges imposed on mask
makers were overcome by changing the mask material from soda lime glass to quartz in order to provide improved
transmission of the 248nm wavelength. This, in turn, required major changes to the mask manufacturing process.
Finally, the existing novolac resists could not absorb enough energy from the new wavelength to cause an adequate
chemical reaction. As a result, new chemically-amplified resist had to be developed for semiconductor
manufacturers to create fine circuits using the new lithography technology. After the ecosystem challenges were
overcome, DUV 248nm steppers could provide resolutions as low as 0.45µm. 16
DUV 193nm Steppers – The industry‟s drive towards finer resolutions continued when tools using the
DUV 193nm wavelength were introduced in 1996. As was the case for the DUV 248, the very low light
wavelength created new challenges in every part of the ecosystem. Since KrF lasers could not produce light with
wavelength of 193nm, a new excimer laser that used Argon Fluoride (ArF) gas was developed. New challenges
were also posed by light absorption problems with the existing lens materials. The challenges were overcome
with the development of a new lens material, calcium fluoride. The resist and the mask also had to undergo major
developments so that this new generation could create value for users. With the change to the 193nm wavelength,
the existing resists, which were engineered to react to the 248nm wavelength, were no longer adequate to the task
– a new generation of chemically amplified resist needed to be developed. Finally, resolution enhancement
15

The resolution capability of lithography technologies that employ a lens system is given by the Rayleigh
criterion:
Resolution = k1 x (Wavelength/Numerical Aperture)
where wavelength is the wavelength of the light being transmitted by the source, numerical aperture is the measure
of the size of the lens, and k1 is a process-specific constant. Hence, to improve the resolution of lithography tools,
manufacturers can either reduce the wavelength of light or increase the size of the lens. A key source of
improvement within the course of a given technology generation has been increases in lens size. When further
increases in lens size become untenable, due to a combination of physical and economic constraints on production,
the industry shifts to a new, smaller, wavelength which heralds the emergence of a new technology generation.
16
Firms that entered the DUV 248nm generation employed two different architectures. With the exception of
Silicon Valley Group, all firms initially developed step-and-repeat systems for the DUV 248nm generation. Silicon
Valley Group entered the new generation with a new step-and-scan architecture (the original step-and-scan
technology was developed by Perkin Elmer, which was acquired by Silicon Valley Group). Step-and-scan systems,
an architectural innovation, can be considered a hybrid between projection scanners and step-and-repeat steppers.
The main benefit was a significant reduction in lens complexity that would provide lower resolution and a larger
field size in order to satisfy the growing demand of large size logic IC‟s. Most firms producing DUV 248nm step
and repeat systems eventually moved to the step-and-scan architecture during the course of the generation.
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technologies (RETs) needed to be developed in order to create masks that could exploit the finer resolution
available from the DUV 193nm steppers. 17 Once these challenges were overcome, DUV 193nm steppers were able
to provide resolutions of 0.15µm.
Non-Optical Technologies
Since the early 1960‟s, optical lithography has been the mainstay of semiconductor manufacturing.
However, there have been several attempts to introduce non-optical technologies that would offer smaller
geometries by using much smaller energy wavelengths outside of the visible spectrum.. Amongst these, the two
technologies that attracted the most interest, resources, and market share were X-ray and electron-beam (E-beam)
lithography. 18
X-ray Printers – The use of X-rays for lithography was proposed due to their very low wavelength of less
than 10nm. In the early 1970‟s, X-ray lithography was developed as a simple proximity imaging system. As in
proximity printing, the radiation from an X-ray source is transmitted through the mask onto the resist. X-ray
lithography‟s very low wavelength created substantial challenges to the implementation of the technology for
semiconductor manufacturing. These challenges included major changes to the source and the mask. Although it
was first introduced in 1978 with great fan fare, X-ray printing has never entered the mainstream – as of the time
of this writing, its ecosystem challenges have yet to be overcome at a competitive, commercial scale.
E-Beam Writers – Electron-beam (E-beam) technology involves patterning the resist on the
semiconductor wafer directly using electron beams the follow a pre-programmed pattern, thereby eliminating the
need for a mask. The major concern with this technology has been its throughput. Since a pre-programmed
electron beam travels across the wafer to achieve very low resolution, the time required to complete a single wafer
can be as high as 10 hrs, which is almost an order of magnitude longer than the alternate optical lithography
technologies. This throughput disadvantage has relegated E-beam writers to high-end, low volume niches. The
major ecosystem challenges posed by E-beam technology are the development of the E-beam source to increase
throughput, as well as new resist chemistries that work with the emitted electrons. At first glance, it might seem
that E-beam lithography should be characterized as a radical technological change for producers. In fact, however,
every firm that entered with an E-beam tool had already offered E-beam based products to other markets (e.g.,
electron microscopy). For these firms, E-beam writers for semiconductor lithography presented only incremental
innovation challenges. None of the pure optical firms, for whom E-beam would have represented a genuinely
radical departure, ever entered the market.

17

RETs control and manipulate the light waves through the mask and the lens, and provide improved contrast of
the projected circuit image. This “wavefront engineering” reduces the k1 of the Rayleigh‟s criterion to provide
lower resolution.
18
Two additional approaches, ion-beam lithography and e-beam projection lithography have also been
experimented with, but neither has ever been commercialized.
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Appendix II
Test of Hypotheses 1 and 2 using OLS regression.
Dependent variable = Ln(firm‟s cumulative market share in a given technology generation).

Model 7
Technology Leadership*Component Challenge

Model 8
-0.044*
(0.023)

Technology Leadership*Complement Challenge
Technology Leadership
Component Challenge
Complement Challenge
Vertical integration
Incumbent
Conglomerate
Constant
R-squared
Observations

0.048*
(0.027)

Model 10
-0.049**
(0.019)
0.052**
(0.025)

Model 11a
-0.049**
(0.021)
0.053*
(0.027)

Model 9

-0.125
(0.081)
-0.107
(0.106)
0.259***
(0.084)

-0.153**
(0.067)
-0.107
(0.105)
0.239***
(0.073)

-0.136
(0.083)
-0.074
(0.104)
0.245***
(0.082)

-0.168**
(0.075)
-0.072
(0.102)
0.220***
(0.072)

-0.155*
(0.089)
-0.099
(0.149)
0.161
(0.110)

1.553***
(0.269)
-0.483
(0.689)
1.474**
(0.648)

1.681***
(0.274)
-0.502
(0.636)
1.368**
(0.659)

1.439***
(0.277)
-0.403
(0.766)
1.370*
(0.683)

1.574***
(0.286)
-0.419
(0.707)
1.242*
(0.694)

1.878***
(0.409)
-0.406
(1.029)
1.111
(0.950)

-3.821***
(0.393)
0.36
64

-3.818***
(0.396)
0.39
64

-3.834***
(0.361)
0.40
64

-3.832***
(0.365)
0.43
64

-4.010***
(0.589)
0.43
50

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
a
Model 11 excludes observations from X-ray and E-beam generations.
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